Laurence Go

I study elections, migration and political behaviour across the world

AXA Research Fellow at the Institute for Economic Analysis (IAE-CSIC) and the Barcelona School of Economics (BSE) in Barcelona. PhD in Applied Economics from the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania), MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics from the London School of Economics, and a BS in Business Economics from the University of the Philippines. Previously a consultant at the World Bank.

Laurence Go

Publications

Labor / Politics

Political Interdependence: Evidence from Emigrant Voter Turnout in 1,267 Elections Worldwide

with Nicolas Fliess and Eva Østergaard-Nielsen

Elections in your host country make you vote back home.

Abstract

We document political interdependence driven by international migration. To examine whether elections in residence countries impact emigrant turnout in homeland elections, we assemble a novel dataset covering 1,267 elections across 43 origin countries and 217 residence countries. Exploiting the quasi-random timing of elections between countries, we find that emigrant turnout increases by 7 percentage points in homeland elections held after residence country elections, compared to those held before. This is consistent with a model of salience where exposure to competitive residence country elections and expanded media coverage increases interest in the political process and drives emigrants to participate in their homeland elections.

Politics

Inattentive Citizens: Impact of Elections on Political Interest across 93 Countries

Elections spike political interest — then it fades within ten days.

Abstract

Democracy, now more than ever, requires constant vigilance and active citizen engagement. Understanding whether, when, and why individuals pay attention to politics is essential to the health of democracy worldwide. Using global survey data with over one million observations, I find that attention to politics is 10% higher after elections. However, this surge is short-lived, returning to pre-election levels after 10 days, with no discernible pre-trend. Political interest is higher in elections where the first round is decisive, when an incumbent loses, and when economic policy is more uncertain. Evidence supports a model of costly information acquisition, in which citizens become significantly more attentive to politics and acquire information after elections.

Development / Politics

When Running for Office Runs in the Family: Horizontal Dynasties, Policy and Development in the Philippines

with Dean Dulay

When relatives hold many offices at once, coordination lifts spending — but not development.

Abstract

Political dynasties exist in practically every type of democracy, but take different forms in different places, yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members of the same political family holding different offices concurrently—affect policymaking by replacing potential political rivals, who might oppose an incumbent’s choices, with a member of the family. But in developing countries, the policy change that accrues from dynastic status may not translate into higher economic development. Using a close-elections regression discontinuity design on Philippine mayors, we show that horizontally dynastic mayors have higher government spending, that direct institutional constraints are the mechanism, and that this does not raise economic development.

Politics / Development

First Among Equals: The First Place Effect and Political Promotion in Multi-Member Plurality Elections

with Dean Dulay

Coming first — not merely winning — makes politicians seek higher office.

Abstract

We study the impact of rank-based decision-making in a multi-member plurality electoral system by examining the decisions of Philippine legislative councilors to run for and win higher office. Focusing on multi-member plurality elections lets us identify the effect of rank among politicians who hold the same office and received a similar number of votes. To identify the causal effect of rank, we conduct a close-elections RD at the village, municipality, and province levels. Our main result is the first place effect: incumbent first-placers are 5-9% (1-4%) more likely to run (win) in future elections than incumbent second-placers.

Working Papers

Politics / Labor

Absence Makes the Vote Grow Farther: Emigrant Voting Patterns Across 180 Homeland Elections

with Eva Østergaard-Nielsen and Nicolas Fliess

Where emigrants settle shapes who they support back home.

Abstract

Emigration reshapes political landscapes, yet studies question to what extent and under what circumstances emigrants support democracy in their countries of origin. Research suggests that migrants, especially those moving to more democratic countries, already have or tend to adopt stronger pro-democratic attitudes. However, evidence on how this impacts voting behavior in homeland elections is inconclusive. We assemble a comprehensive dataset that captures emigrant votes by country of residence across 180 homeland elections worldwide. Using panel regressions with various fixed effects specifications, we show that migrants’ residence in more democratic countries is associated with more support for pro-democracy parties in homeland elections, though this pattern reverses in scenarios of larger ‘democracy gaps’. Leveraging a staggered difference-in-differences design, we further demonstrate that the parliamentary presence of anti-immigrant parties in countries of residence increases emigrant support for pro-democracy parties at home. These findings advance debates on migration and transnational democratic engagement.

Politics

Pride and Prejudice: Impact of National Days on Patriotism and Attitudes Toward Immigrants

with Nicolas Fliess

National days cool nationalism where countries are ethnically divided.

Abstract

Patriotism, an individual sense of pride to belong to a country, is often considered by states as an important factor to secure citizen support. Yet this feeling may go beyond mere national allegiance, as it can significantly shape perceptions of out-group members. While past research has explored the interconnectedness of state-sponsored patriotism, national identification, and attitudes toward immigrants, robust empirical evidence on how these factors relate remains scarce. This paper explores the mechanism through which states foster patriotism and how this, in turn, influences attitudes toward immigrants, focusing on state-sponsored patriotism through national day celebrations given their global prevalence. We assemble a global dataset of publicly available surveys consisting of 2.7 million observations from 1985-2023. Employing an event-study design, we measure exposure to the national day as the temporal difference between survey dates and these celebrations. Leading up to the national day, citizens exhibit a lower sense of patriotism and continue to do so a few days after, returning to pre-national-day levels within two weeks. This negative result is primarily driven by countries with higher ethnic fractionalisation. We argue that in highly diverse countries, individuals are more likely to resist a unifying state narrative, becoming more open to inclusive or pluralistic conceptions of belonging, reflected in more positive attitudes toward immigrants.

Works in Progress

Development / Politics

Economic Nationalism and Industrial Development: Evidence from the 1975 Naturalization Law

with Jonas Hjort and Tillmann von Carnap

A 1975 law opening Philippine industry to foreigners, as a lens on economic nationalism.

Abstract

As economic nationalism gains ground globally, its consequences remain unclear. We study a 1975 Philippine naturalization law that opened protected industries to foreign investors, showing how economic nationalism shapes industry growth, economic development, and market outcomes.

Development / Politics

Does Data Constrain Discretion? Evidence from Close Elections and Cash Subsidy Allocation in the Philippines

with Daffodil Santillan

Stronger local data systems curb favoritism in cash aid.

Abstract

Discretionary targeting of social transfers creates scope for political capture, yet the institutional conditions that constrain it remain poorly understood. Combining administrative data on beneficiaries with a novel survey of local data systems, I exploit close village elections in the Philippines in a regression discontinuity design to study whether elected officials direct emergency cash transfers toward their relatives, and whether local data infrastructure constrains this favoritism. Narrowly winning a 2018 election increases the number of a candidate’s relatives receiving emergency subsidies by 0.15 to 0.28—an effect of 3 to 5 percent, concentrated entirely along the intensive margin. No such effect appears under the centralized, rule-based conditional cash transfer, establishing that favoritism is a product of discretionary program design rather than the electoral environment. Crucially, the favoritism effect is progressively attenuated by stronger municipal administrative data infrastructure, consistent with the view that institutionalized data infrastructure conditions the space within which political incentives translate into distributive advantage for family networks.

Politics / Labor

Voting Without Borders: Effects of Migrant Enfranchisement on Democratic Perceptions

with Dean Dulay

What changes when countries extend the vote to citizens abroad?

Abstract

Since 1980, the share of states allowing their citizens abroad to vote has risen from roughly 13% to 72%, enfranchising an estimated 200 million emigrants across more than 140 countries—yet the consequences of this twenty-first-century franchise extension remain almost entirely unstudied. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design spanning 1950-2020, we estimate the effects of extending the vote to emigrants on migrant-targeted government spending, electoral competition, diaspora political attention, and democratic attitudes and quality. We distinguish de jure from de facto enfranchisement, address the strategic timing of reforms, and probe mechanisms by interacting enfranchisement with the share of the diaspora living in democracies.