LAURENCE ANTHONY GO
Postdoctoral Researcher
University of Oslo
I am a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oslo. My research interests center on political economy, development and labor economics. I completed my PhD in Applied Economics at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. I also earned my MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics at the London School of Economics and my BS in Business Economics at the University of the Philippines. I also served as a consultant at the World Bank.
PUBLICATIONS
We study the impact of rank-based decision-making in a multi-member plurality electoral system by examining the decisions of Philippine legislative councilors to run for and win higher office. By focusing on multi-member plurality elections, we identify the effect of rank amongst politicians that hold the same office and received a similar number of votes. To identify the causal effect of rank, we conduct a close-elections RD at the village, municipality, and province levels. Our main result is the first place effect: incumbent first placers are 5–9% (1–4%) more likely to run (win) in future elections than incumbent second placers. The first place effect is unique among rank effects: subsequent rank comparisons yield substantially weaker or insignificant results. Further evidence suggests that a variety of potential mechanisms—party alignment, strategic voting, differential levels of media exposure or the better performance of first placers—do not seem to explain our results. These results improve our understanding of the variety of ways rank effects interact with electoral systems.
Journal of Public Economics
200 (August 2021)
Political dynasties exist in practically every type of democracy, but take different forms in different places. Yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from the same political family holding different political offices concurrently—affect policymaking by replacing potential political rivals, who may oppose an incumbent’s policy choices, with a member of the family. But in developing countries, the policy change that accrues from dynastic status may not lead to higher levels of economic development. We test this argument’s implications in the Philippines. Using a close elections regression discontinuity design on a sample of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels of government spending, (ii) direct institutional constraints are the mechanism that drives this core result, and (iii) horizontally dynastic mayors do not lead to higher economic growth economic growth or lower poverty.
Comparative Political Studies
55, no. 4 (March 2022): 588-627
Absence Makes the Vote Grow Farther: Emigrant Voting Patterns Across 180 Homeland Elections
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R&R, American Journal of Political Science
WORKING PAPERS
Political Interdependence: Evidence from Migrant Turnout in 1,267 Elections Worldwide
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Conditionally Accepted, JEEA
We document political interdependence driven by international migration. To investigate whether host country elections impact migrant turnout in homeland elections, we assemble a novel dataset of migrant turnout in 1,267 elections across 43 origin countries and 217 destination countries. Using the quasi-random timing of elections between countries, we find that migrant turnout in homeland elections occurring after host country elections increases by 7pp relative to turnout in homeland elections before. This is consistent with a model of salience where exposure to competitive host country elections increases interest in the political process and drives migrants to participate in their homeland elections.
Democracy, now more than ever, requires constant vigilance and active citizen engagement. Understanding whether, when, and why individuals pay attention to politics is therefore essential to the health of democracy worldwide. Using millions of observations from global survey data, I find that attention to politics is 12% higher after elections. However, this surge is short-lived, returning to pre-election levels after 10 days. There is also no discernible pre-trend, with political attention remaining stable prior to the election. Political interest is higher in elections where the first round is decisive, when an incumbent loses and when economic policy is more uncertain. Conversely, political interest tends to be lower in autocratic states and developing countries. Following elections, citizens consume news and discuss politics more frequently. Evidence supports a model of costly information acquisition where citizens are only attentive to politics and acquire information post- election. Campaigns and respondent selection cannot rationalize the results. The findings highlight how the costs of attention can limit sustained political engagement—particularly in low-income contexts, where higher opportunity costs reduce citizens’ ability to stay informed—with significant implications for political accountability and development outcomes.
Studies of emigrant voting in homeland elections have questioned to what extent emigrants change their political preferences from afar. On the one hand, migration transforms emigrants’ political preferences through exposure to their countries of residence. On the other, emigrants display similar political preferences to home country electorates because their political socialization take place prior to departure. Drawing on an extensive novel dataset of emigrant votes per country of residence in 180 homeland elections worldwide, we estimate pairwise fixed effects regressions to show that political distance, defined as the difference in Polity scores between the countries of origin and residence, is related to systematic differences between the emigrant and homeland vote. The direction migration also matters: this result is largely driven by migrants moving to more democratic countries.
Inattentive Citizens: Impact of Elections on Political Interest Across Five Million Citizens Worldwide
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R&R, Journal of Development Economics
WORKS IN PROGRESS
Migrant Workers and Labor Institutions in Spain
How do labor institutions shape the experiences of migrant workers? We study the impact of collective bargaining agreements in Spain on migrant workers’ wages, welfare, and migration decisions. Using detailed administrative data, we provide new evidence on how labor protections influence not just economic outcomes but also migration patterns.
Pride and Prejudice: Impact of National Days on Patriotism and Attitudes Toward Immigrants
What drives nationalism? Leveraging variation in the timing of national days relative to political survey dates, we provide empirical evidence that national days reduce levels of nationalism in ethnically fragmented countries. We further examine how this effect shapes public attitudes toward migration.
Economic Nationalism and Industrial Development: Evidence from the 1975 Naturalization Law
As economic nationalism gains ground globally, understanding its impact has become more urgent. While often linked to populism, security fears, and political ideology, its consequences remain unclear. We study a 1975 Philippine naturalization law that opened protected industries to foreign investors to show how economic nationalism shapes industry growth, economic development, and market outcomes.